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Abstract In professional settings, people often have diverse and competing con-
ceptions of responsibility and of when it is fair to hold someone responsible. This
may lead to undesirable gaps in the distribution of responsibilities. In this paper, a
procedural model is developed for alleviating the tension between diverging
responsibility conceptions. The model is based on the Rawlsian approach of wide
reflective equilibrium and overlapping consensus. The model is applied to a tech-
nological project, which concerned the development of an in-house monitoring
system based on ambient technology. The development of this innovative tech-
nology raised questions among the technological researchers about its social
acceptance and the way issues related to privacy and security should be addressed.
The case is analyzed in terms of two procedural norms (reflective learning and
inclusiveness), which are based on literature on policy and innovation networks.
Analysis of the case shows that, in a pluralist setting, a procedural approach can be
useful for encouraging discussion on the legitimacy of different responsibility
conceptions and the question what a fair responsibility distribution amounts to.
Zusammenfassung In professionellen Kontexten haben Menschen oft unter-
schiedliche und konfligierende Vorstellungen von Verantwortlichkeit und bezu¨glich
der Frage, wann es gerechtfertigt ist, jemanden zur Verantwortung zu ziehen. Das
kann zu unerwu¨nschten Lu¨cken in der Verteilung von Verantwortlichkeiten fu¨hren.
In diesem Artikel wird ein verfahrensorientiertes Modell entwickelt, das die
Spannung zwischen strittigen Vorstellungen von Verantwortlichkeit mindern kann.
Dieses Modell basiert auf dem Rawlsschen Ansatz des weiten U¨berlegungsgleich-
gewichts und u¨bergreifenden Konsenses. Dieses Modell wird auf ein technologi-
sches Projekt angewandt, in dem ein hausinternes U¨berwachungssystem, basierend
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auf Umgebungstechnologie, entwickelt wird. Die Entwicklung dieser innovativen
Technologie ruft bei den Ingenieuren Fragen bezu¨glich der gesellschaftlichen Akzep-
tanz und der Weise, wie Themen der Privatspha¨re und Sicherheit aufgegriffen
werden sollten, auf. Dieses Beispiel wird mit Hilfe zweier prozessorientierter
Normen (reflektives Lernen und Inkludivita¨t) analysiert, die aus der Literatur u¨ber
Verwaltungs- und Innovationsnetzwerke stammen. Eine Analyse des Beispiels zeigt,
dass ein verfahrensorientierter Ansatz in einem pluralistischen Kontext nu¨tzlich sein
kann, um eine Diskussion u¨ber die Legitimita¨t verschiedener Verantwortungskon-
zepte und einer gerechten Verteilung von Verantwortlichkeiten anzuregen.
Resume´e Dans le contexte professionnel, les individus ont souvent des conceptions
diversifie´es et compe´titives de la question de la responsabilite´ et/ou celle de savoir
quand il est e´quitable de tenir quelqu’un pour responsable. Cela risque de susciter
d’inde´sirables lacunes dans la re´partition des responsabilite´s. L’article pre´sente un
mode`le proce´dural, mis au point pour atte´nuer la tension entre les conceptions
divergentes sur la responsabilite´. Le mode`le se base sur l’approche de Rawls qui
conside`re une large conception de l’e´quilibre re´fle´chi et du consensus chevauchant,
dans une socie´te´ pluraliste. Le mode`le a e´te´ applique´ a` un projet technologique
concernant le de´veloppement d’un syste`me de surveillance interne, qui est base´ sur une
nouvelle technologie de l’intelligence ambiante. Le de´veloppement de cette nouvelle
technologie a souleve´ des questions parmi les chercheurs en technologie, sur
l’acceptation sociale et sur le traitement des proble`mes lie´s a` la vie prive´e et a` la
se´curite´. Le cas a e´te´ analyse´ selon deux normes proce´durales (l’apprentissage re´flexif
et l’inclusivite´), qui sont base´es sur la documentation relative a` la politique et aux
re´seaux sociaux. L’analyse du cas montre qu’une approche proce´durale, applique´e
dans un contexte pluraliste, peut servir a` encourager la discussion portant sur la
le´gitimite´ des conceptions diffe´rentes de la responsabilite´ et sur la question de savoir ce
que repre´sente une re´partition e´quitable des responsabilite´s.
1 Introduction
Technological research is increasingly carried out in networks of organizations with
different kinds of actors involved. These networks often lack a strict hierarchy and a
clear task division (cf. Callon et al. 1992; Rogers and Bozeman 2001; Saari and
Miettinen 2001). Consequently, decisions are subject to negotiation instead of top-
down decision making. This increases the likelihood of the problem of many hands,
which is the difficulty, even in principle, to identify the person responsible for some
outcome (Bovens 1998; Thompson 1980). The occurrence of this problem in
Research and Development (R&D) is especially undesirable, since the introduction
of technologies can be accompanied by risks and unforeseen side-effects as well,
often with high impact (e.g., the use of asbestos, CFCs, DDT, nuclear waste and the
greenhouse effect). If no one is responsible for addressing these issues, the
implementation of technologies might result in harmful consequences for society.
Research has shown that the problem of many hands can be partly traced back to
different views on responsibility (Doorn 2010b). In a pluralist society, people have
170 Poiesis Prax (2010) 7:169–188
123
different views on what responsibility amounts to and under what conditions one is
responsible. Whereas some people defend a virtue ethical approach to responsibil-
ity, others take a deontological or consequentialist stance (see e.g., Nihle´n Fahlquist
(2006), Williams (2008) or Goodin (1995) for a discussion of some of these
approaches). Responsibility conceptions can differ in at least two ways. First, people
may have a different understanding of what responsibility actually means (e.g.,
giving an account of something, to compensate for potential loss, to have a task to
do something, to take care of something). Secondly, people may have different
conceptions on when a person is responsible. In this paper, I focus on the second
type of diversity: diversity in opinions on when a person is responsible.
The different conceptions may lead to different distributions of responsibilities.
People defending a virtue ethical approach to responsibility, for example, may
consider it a researcher’s responsibility to show the merits of a technology to the
broader society, whereas people with a more duty-based conception of responsi-
bility may think in terms of a formal task description and consider this particular
responsibility not to be part of that description.
In order to do justice to this pluralism of responsibility conceptions, there is a
need for a distributing procedure that leads to a workable agreement but that, at the
same time, leaves room for different responsibility conceptions without favoring
any one in particular. Simply distributing on the basis of majority rule is potentially
unfair to groups representing minority views.
In this paper, I develop an approach that is based on procedural political theory.
The underlying thought is that people do not have to agree on substantive conditions
which tell when a person is responsible as long as they agree on the procedure for
distributing the responsibilities (given that they have a shared understanding of what
responsibility means. The latter is important to prevent people from talking at cross-
purposes). If such a procedure, or its outcome, is accepted by all people involved as
representing the ‘‘fair terms of cooperation,’’ this might help reconcile the pluralist
responsibility conceptions and, ultimately, alleviate the problem of many hands. In
order to test the applicability of political theory to responsibility distributions, the
model of procedural justice is applied to a real case. The guiding question is whether
a procedural approach contributes to reconciling the pluralist responsibility
conceptions.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Following this introduction, I sketch a
procedural approach to justice based on Rawls’ political liberalism. After explaining
the approach, I describe two procedural norms that are derived from policy and
innovation theory. Subsequently, I apply the approach to an empirical case in order
to see whether the method contributes to reconciling the pluralist responsibility
conceptions. In the final section, conclusions are given, together with recommen-
dations for further research.
2 A procedural approach to justice: Rawls’ political liberalism
Professional responsibility and the distribution thereof is a topic that has gained
increasing attention in recent years. Not only the scholarly literature on professional
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ethics but also professional settings themselves often reveal a large variety in
responsibility conceptions. Adherents of virtue ethics or care ethics, for example,
emphasize the agent’s character and the morally relevant features of a situation,
herewith trying to answer the question what a responsible person in this situation
would do (Ladd 1991; Oakley and Cocking 2001; Van Hooft 2006). Professional
responsibility in duty ethics is often defined in terms of preventing wrong-doing.
The main question in duty ethics is what the agent’s duty is and what rules she
should follow (Van Hooft 2006:9–17). Yet another approach is a consequentialist
conception of responsibility, such as defended by, for example, Goodin (1995).
According to this approach, responsibility should be conceived as largely a matter
of result-oriented tasks.
In professional networks, these different perspectives may all be represented by
the different actors constituting the network. Moreover, if we recognize the political
ideal of pluralism, these different perspectives are all legitimate.1
In R&D networks,2 this pluralism in responsibility conceptions leads to the
problem of how to distribute responsibilities. Since professional networks often lack
strict hierarchical relations, decision making is done on the basis of mutual
negotiations rather than top-down decision making. It remains therefore open how
responsibilities should be distributed. Even if people would agree what an engineer’s
professional responsibility involves (e.g., the task to prevent certain risks stemming
from a technology), it is not obvious how this responsibility should be distributed
among the engineers constituting the research team. Should it be done in as early a
stage of technology development by the team member doing fundamental research or
by the team members commercially exploiting the technology? The answer to this
question is partly dependent on the responsibility conception one endorses. The
pluralist thesis implies that the diverse and competing visions of responsibility
cannot be reduced to one overarching conception. Hence, people should somehow
find a consensus concerning how responsibilities are to be distributed. However,
what counts as a justified consensus remains open; not any consensus will do. Even in
the absence of a strict hierarchy, power relations may still be present. Critics of
consensus policy often warn that the promotion of consensus is coercive,
notwithstanding its democratic aims. The promotion of consensus runs the risk of
negotiating the interests of the most powerful. If one actor defends a virtue ethical
approach to responsibility but agrees to distribute responsibility according to tasks in
order to gain something else in return, it is questionable whether the agreement
counts as a justified consensus. In order to assess which kind of consensus can be
considered justified (where justified is understood as ‘‘doing justice to pluralism
without favoring one view over the other’’), we need a framework that incorporates
both the ideal of consensus and that of pluralism.
1 In this paper, pluralism is understood as the acknowledgment of diverse and competing values and
visions of the good life. It is assumed to be the cornerstone of democracy because it distributes power
over multiple centers, herewith countering authoritarianism (Dryzek and Niemeyer 2006). According to
the pluralist thesis, conflicting private values cannot simply be reduced to single public values.
2 In this paper, I use the term R&D network to refer to professional teams working on a common project
and not to the wider scientific community (which is sometimes also referred to as network).
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In political theory, the idea of procedural justice has emerged as a way to provide
such a framework. The term procedural justice refers to the way procedures (e.g.,
decision making procedures) are structured so that their outcomes can be considered
fair. The term is especially relevant in pluralist societies where people often cannot
agree on substantive views on what justice amounts to. An example of procedural
justice is the principle that those who are affected by a certain decision be afforded
the opportunity to participate in the decision making.
In recent decades, different solutions have been proposed to find a workable
middle ground between the ideals of consensus and pluralism, all balancing
substantive views on justice with procedural requirements. A highly developed and
differentiated procedural political theory is Rawls’ political liberalism.3 Rawls
attempts to propose the formal conditions under which the decision making can be
deemed fair. His theory is particularly attractive, because it provides both an
elaborated justificatory framework and a constructive framework for encouraging
reflection (Doorn 2010a).
Central in Rawls’ theory are the concepts of overlapping consensus and wide
reflective equilibrium (WRE). Rawls’ aim was to develop a criterion of justice that
would be agreed upon by all under conditions that are fair to all (Rawls 2001:15).
Although Rawls at first wanted to develop a substantive theory of justice for a
relatively homogeneous well-ordered society, he revised this idea of a well-ordered
society in his later work. Recognizing the permanent plurality of incompatible and
irreconcilable moral frameworks within a democratic society, he introduced the
concept of overlapping consensus. People are able to live together despite
conflicting moral values and ideals as long as they share a moral commitment to
the society’s basic structure.
People with different comprehensive doctrines must be able to justify for
themselves the acceptability of the claims of political justice (Rawls 1993:28,
1995:143, 1999 [1971]:28). Rawls introduced the idea of reflective equilibrium to
refer to this individual justification. In this idea, a distinction is made between three
levels of considerations: (1) considered moral judgments about particular cases or
situations, (2) moral principles and (3) descriptive and normative background
theories. Assuming that all people want to arrive at a conception of justice that
yields definite solutions and that is complete, in the sense that it is more than a mere
collection of accidental convictions, people should aim at coherence between the
considerations at the different levels. We speak of equilibrium if the different layers
cohere and are mutually supportive; it is called reflective if the equilibrium is
arrived at by working back and forth between the different considerations and if all
are appropriately adjustable in the light of new situations or points of view; and it is
called wide if coherence is achieved between all three levels of considerations and
not only between the considered judgments and moral principles (in which case we
speak of narrow reflective equilibrium). Although people with different compre-
hensive doctrines might arrive at different WREs, they likely have an overlap when
3 I do not want to suggest that Rawls’ theory is the only procedural theory. Deliberative democracy, such
as defended by, among others, Cohen (1989, 1997) and Elster (1986, 1998), is an other example of a
highly developed procedural theory. The concept of deliberation can also be linked to the work of the
German philosopher Ju¨rgen Habermas (1990).
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it comes to the basic principles of fairness. This ‘‘shared module’’ is what Rawls
calls the overlapping consensus (Rawls 2001).
Dryzek and Niemeyer (2006) argue that, notwithstanding its focus on formal
structure, the establishment of an overlapping consensus still requires agreement on
the substantive values underlying the procedure.4 The management of pluralism
requires a shared tradition (such as liberalism) or a shared set of values to
acknowledge the legitimacy of other comprehensive doctrines (p. 636). As such, the
approach seems still biased toward liberalism. However, Rawls makes a distinction
between different forms of justification, allowing some to be more substantive than
others. The complete idea of justice as fairness5 will most probably not be part of
shared WRE, but in a plural society it can still be endorsed by reasonable
comprehensive doctrines as a political conception of justice, that is, as a basis of
social unity in a constitutional democracy with a plurality of reasonable but
incompatible—religious, philosophical and moral—doctrines. People with diver-
gent comprehensive doctrines can overlap in their acceptance of a conception of
justice, because they are likely to share at least some beliefs about reasonable
pluralism. They do not have to agree on all particular decisions, but they do agree on
‘‘principles of fairness’’ related to the political realm, which get shape as the
society’s basic institutions. Being the focus of an overlapping consensus, these
principles specify the fair terms of cooperation among citizens and the conditions
under which a society’s basic institutions can be deemed just (Rawls 1993). Rawls
calls this pro tanto justification, which draws on public reasons or arguments only
(i.e., values, judgments, principles and background theories valid for the public
domain). It is done ‘‘without looking to, or trying to fit, or even knowing what are,
the existing comprehensive doctrines’’ (Rawls 1995). An individual citizen can then
try to fit this political conception of justice into his own comprehensive doctrine.
This is what Rawls calls full justification, which is carried out by an individual
citizen as a member of civil society and in which the citizen accepts a political
4 A similar criticism comes from Habermas, who argues that Rawls introduces a particular conception of
the moral person into his theory. According to Habermas, it is especially the sense of fairness and the
capacity of the good which are in need of prior justification (Habermas 1995:112).
5 The term Justice as Fairness is used by John Rawls to refer to his distinctive theory of justice in which
he developed two principles for organizing modern welfare state. The first principle, known as the equal
liberty principle, states that each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty
compatible with similar liberty for others. The second principle describes two conditions that are to be
satisfied in case of social and economic inequalities: (a) The inequalities are to be attached to positions
and offices open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity (the fair equality of opportunity
principle); and (b), The inequalities are to be to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of
society (the difference principle; Rawls 1993:5–6, 2001:42). At the philosophy seminar of the Royal
Institute of Technology (Stockholm), where I presented a draft version of this paper, I was rightly pointed
to the fact that Rawls derives fairness from his veil of ignorance, which assumes that people do not know
which comprehensive doctrines they adhere to. Under this condition of ignorance, justice implies fairness
and vice versa. This means that only for the first kind of justification, the terms justice and fairness could
be used interchangeably. However, in order to be consistent with the responsibility terminology and
everyday language, I take a more lenient stance and use the term fair or fairness also to refer to the
outcomes of the other types of justification (where Rawls would probably prefer the term justified rather
than fair; the same holds for the ‘‘appropriateness’’ of responsibility ascriptions, which he would probably
judge in terms of being justified or not rather than being fair or not).
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conception and fills out its justification by embedding it in his own comprehensive
doctrine. This latter justification does not require adherence to liberalism.
Central in most liberal theories of justice is the notion of ‘‘public reason.’’ This
holds for Rawls as well. Compared to, for example, deliberative democracy
theorists—and Habermas in particular—Rawls has a restricted notion of public
reason. Habermas, for example, defends a conception of public reason which
includes all unofficial arenas of public discourse; these unofficial arenas in fact
ground democratic self-government and political autonomy (McCarthy 1994:49).
For Rawls, however, public reason is limited to the official institutions. Since his
procedural approach to justice aims at ‘‘uncovering a public basis of justification on
questions of political justice given the fact of reasonable pluralism,’’ it should
proceed from ‘‘what is, or can be, held in common; and so […] begin from shared
fundamental ideas implicit in the public political culture in the hope of developing
from them a political conception that can gain free and reasoned agreement in
judgment’’ (Rawls 1993). Hence, the function of public reason is not so much to be
critical but rather to be constructive. Public reason, therefore, needs to start from
shared ideas and organize those into a political conception that can serve as the
focus of an overlapping consensus, which in turn can enhance stability. Rawls
connects his conception of reasonableness to T.M. Scanlon’s principle of moral
motivation, which is one of the basic principles of contractualism (Scanlon
1982:104, 115). The principle tells us that we have a ‘‘basic desire to be able to
justify our actions to others on grounds they could not reasonably reject’’ (Rawls
1993:49–50; fn 2).
Similar to deliberative approaches in Technology Assessment (TA), which are
based on deliberative democracy procedural theory, Rawlsian concepts have also
found their way to more applied contexts. Especially in the context of applied
ethics, the tension between diverging moral frameworks is an urgent problem (e.g.,
how to sustain the conditions of the good life in a globalizing world (Dower 2004;
Hardin 1999), or how to decide on issues related to abortion (Little 1999) or living
organ donation (Hilhorst 2005)). Rawlsian approaches seem promising for
answering these kinds of questions, since they offer a methodological alternative
to the extreme positions of ethical generalism and (specified) principlism on the one
hand and particularism on the other (Daniels 1996; St. John 2007; Van den Hoven
1997).6 Rawlsian justification avoids the drawbacks of both extremes, because it
aims at coherence between the abstract theoretic principles and the more particular
considered judgments without giving priority to any of them. As such Rawlsian
approaches seem to offer a promising decision making procedure within applied
6 Proponents of the first category argue that applied ethics is essentially the application of general moral
principles (Beauchamp and Childress 1994:112; Degrazia 1992; Lustig 1992) or theories (Gert et al.
1997; Hare 1988) to particular situations. This position is criticized for mistakenly assuming that valid
principles can be formulated that govern all rational persons. Moreover, the critics argue, procedures for
deducing answers to moral questions is impossible, unnecessary, and undesirable. These critics argue for
situational adequacy, that is, an ideal of doing justice to persons in a particular historical context. The
problem with particularism, on the other hand, is that it runs the risk of lacking moral justification. In
most situations where ethical reflection is at stake, people should be able to justify their actions in terms
of moral principles. However, if particularism is carried through to the extreme, it becomes difficult to
provide public justification of moral judgments (Van den Hoven 1997:240–241).
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ethics.7 Especially the concept of WRE seems an attractive method for real-life
justification. Even without reference to political concepts as overlapping consensus,
the notion of WRE can help explain why people consider certain things fair or
unfair. Moreover, since the Rawlsian approach takes the different layers of morality
explicitly into account, the approach seems to provide a powerful tool for
encouraging reflection. The criticism that the Rawlsian procedural approach to
justice requires that people share the tradition of liberalism does not seem valid. It is
sufficient that people acknowledge that reasonable pluralism is the permanent
condition and that the concept of reasonableness replaces that of moral truth. This is
not the same as sharing the comprehensive view of liberalism. In a professional
setting where people are motivated to work toward a fair distribution of
responsibilities, this demand of ‘‘reasonableness’’ is probably a realistic one.
McCarthy (1994) argues that it is a strength of Rawls’ theory that he allows different
levels of abstraction. The more difficult it becomes to agree on general interests and
shared values, the higher the level of abstraction of the overlapping consensus.
However, it could also work the other way around; in case of responsibility
distributions, people can disagree on the abstract levels of responsibility conceptions
and principles, but agree on particular responsibility ascriptions.
In the next section, I develop this Rawlsian procedural approach further to assess
the fairness of responsibility distributions.
3 Procedural fairness in responsibility distributions: two procedural norms
In their paper on reflective equilibrium in R&D networks, Van de Poel and Zwart
(2010) derive two procedural norms that follow from applying the Rawlsian method
of WRE to actual cases: reflective learning and inclusiveness. According to the
authors, these norms, which are also used in the literature on policy and innovation
networks, contribute to achieving a justified overlapping consensus. Before
explaining the relation between these norms and the procedural approach, I first
discuss the two norms in somewhat more detail.
3.1 Reflective learning
Since the last decades, several interactive and participatory methods have been
proposed to successfully implement and develop new technologies (where
successful is understood as ‘‘sustainable,’’ ‘‘responsible,’’ or some other desirable
adjective). Most often these processes are shaped and evaluated in terms of the
7 In addition to this justificatory application, Rawlsian approaches are sometimes used in a constructive
way as well. In the latter case, they are used as a framework for structuring discussion and debate, with
the aim of coming to a justified agreement. The method could then be used, for example, as a means to
attain a coherent basis for decision making in ethical committees or to gain support for particular
decisions in the context of public policy (Holmgren 1987). This second way of applying Rawlsian
approaches is comparable to the constructive application of deliberative approaches, albeit the Rawlsian
ones take the moral background theories and principles more explicitly into account.
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degree of learning experienced within the network or organization of relevant
actors.
Most scholarly literature on learning goes back to the work of Fischer (1980,
1995) and Scho¨n (1983). Fischer conceptualized his ‘‘levels of argumentation’’ (he
does not refer to learning or reflection explicitly) within the context of policy
making. Scho¨n refers to the professions of engineering, architecture, management,
psychotherapy, and town planning to show how professionals meet challenges by
engaging in a process of ‘‘reflection-in-action.’’ A distinction is generally made
between two levels of learning or reflection: lower-order versus higher-order
discourse (Fischer 1980) or reflection (Scho¨n 1983), single-loop versus double-loop
learning (Argyris and Scho¨n 1978; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993) or adaptive
versus generative learning (Senge 1990). Although the contexts and the exact
definitions differ, the distinction between the two types of learning in all cases is
more or less similar. In the lower-order category, the learning process is a kind of
technical or instrumental learning. It is reactive, short-term focused, within a
context of fixed objectives (as applied to policy), a context of fixing new problems
within the same problem definition and procedures (as applied to organization), or a
context of technological design optimization (Brown et al. 2003; Hoogma et al.
2001). In the higher-order category of learning, the objectives, problem definitions
and procedures are not tested but questioned and explored (Hoogma et al. 2001). It
therefore involves the redefinition of policy goals and changes in norms and values
(Brown et al. 2003). This higher-order learning is also more long-term focused. In
the remainder of the text, I will use the term ‘‘reflective learning’’ to refer to these
higher-order learning processes.
The effect of learning in organizations can be conceived as a threefold shift
(Brown et al. 2003): (1) a shift in framing of the problem; (2) a shift in principle
approaches to solving the problem and in weighing of choices between alternatives,
and (3) a shift in the relationships among actors in a professional network as well as
the broader sphere. It is especially this third shift (a shift in the relationships among
actors) together with the object of reflective learning (appreciative systems and
overarching theories) which makes reflective learning such an important phenom-
enon in the context of responsibility distributions. In the discussion of procedural
justice, it was explained how WRE can be used to decide on issues in a context of
reasonable pluralism (i.e., in a situation with diverse and competing interests).
Reasonableness requires that people recognize the legitimacy of other actors in the
network with other moral views. Lower-order learning occurs when people become
aware of their position in the network and the possible differences in actor roles,
agendas, perceptions, values, and interests among the actors. The awareness of these
differences enhances the instrumental rationality of the actors in the sense they
realize that the other actors enable or constrain the achievement of certain goals
(Van de Poel and Zwart 2010:181). In case of reflective learning, actors are not only
aware of these differences but they also recognize the legitimacy of these other
views. Reflective learning therefore includes reflection on the desirable properties of
the network as a whole. Additionally, it might help distinguishing between private
and public values, that is, between arguments that are and that are not legitimate and
important for an actor fulfilling a specific role in the network. Reflective learning
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might thus contribute to achieving an overlapping consensus concerning a fair
distribution of responsibilities among actors within a network displaying a large
variety of value systems and background theories (ibid.).
3.2 Inclusiveness and openness
The second norm that Van de Poel and Zwart (2010) distinguish is ‘‘inclusiveness’’
or ‘‘openness,’’ which can be described as the norm that all relevant actors are
included in a network. Van de Poel and Zwart explain which actors can be
considered a relevant actor in terms of the Rawlsian criterion of public reason. Each
actor that can legitimately claim to have a ‘‘reasonable stake’’ or a ‘‘reasonable
interest,’’ where reasonableness means that it can be argued upon on the basis of
public reasons, can be considered a relevant actor. Since this point of relevance will
probably always be a point of debate, the authors add the criterion of openness,
which serves to warrant the possibility that new aspects become relevant (p. 182).8
However, openness has an additional, more institutional feature. The criterion of
openness calls for an open discourse, which means that it is not only important that
all relevant actors are included, but that they have equal opportunities for
participating in and contributing to the decision making process as well. If a group
of actors with different fields and levels of expertise are engaged in a conversation,
it is important that the vocabulary used by the experts is understandable to all. The
criterion of openness also requires that people feel free to bring in unwelcome
arguments. If some actors are discouraged to do so and remain silent, the
overlapping consensus that is arrived at cannot be justified as being fair. Together,
inclusiveness and openness determine when an overlapping consensus can be
considered fair. They prevent ‘‘unjustified shortcuts to a wide reflective equilibrium
or overlapping consensus’’ (ibid.). The latter could be the case when people with
unwelcome arguments are excluded from the network.
Van de Poel and Zwart exert on explaining why this notion of justified
overlapping consensus does not imply that they smuggle in some substantive notion
of public reason. As explained in Sect. 2, critics of consensus theory (cf. Mouffe
1999, 2000; Young 1996, 2000) argue that, under the sway of deliberation, the goal
of consensus can all too easily be equated with the interests of the powerful. Hence,
we can understand that not any consensus is a democratic outcome. In other words,
we cannot avoid introducing some criterion to distinguish a valid consensus from an
invalid one. Although Young goes further (in that she doubts every instance of
consensus), Rawls would probably agree that reference to consensus requires due
care in order to distinguish it from a mere compromise or modus vivendi (Rawls
2001:191). In case of the latter, people come to an agreement on the basis of some
negotiational process in which power relations and mutual dependencies play a
crucial role. For the actors, the outcome may be a satisfactory one; they decide so on
8 This resembles the Habermassian understanding of justice as an ongoing exercise of political
autonomy, which is always incomplete and subject to shifting historical circumstances (Habermas
1995:131). For Habermas, no conception of justice can ever be final and some questions should therefore
explicitly be left open (p. 118). The composition of the network seems a plausible instance of such an
‘‘open’’ question.
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the basis of pragmatic and sometimes prudential reasons. However, even if all actors
agree, this does not equate such a bargained compromise with a morally justifiable
consensus. The procedural criterion of inclusiveness and openness provides
justificatory force to the consensus that is achieved in the network. The fact that
this criterion is based on a certain notion of public reason is not so much
problematic but rather an intrinsic element of the method. Managing pluralism
requires a distinction between ‘‘valid’’ and ‘‘nonvalid’’ reasons, between ‘‘public’’
and ‘‘nonpublic’’ ones. To base the demarcation on a notion of public reason that
others ‘‘could not reasonably reject’’—to use Scanlon’s wording—seems a strength
rather than a weakness.9
3.3 Relation between the two norms and fairness in responsibility distributions:
sufficient or necessary conditions
With the two procedural norms described in the previous sections, we can now
analyze whether these two norms are indeed beneficial to reconciling different
responsibility conceptions. This requires a series of steps. The first is to see whether
people can agree on a distribution of responsibilities and are able to give a pro tanto
justification. If that is the case, we have achieved a consensus. The next step is then
to see whether this distribution of responsibilities is also coherent with everyone’s
individual conception of responsibility; in other words, whether it fits within each
individual’s own WRE. If that is the case, we can speak of a justified overlapping
consensus of the responsibility distribution.
Although Van de Poel and Zwart say that the two procedural norms are
contributory to getting a justified overlapping consensus, their description of the
norm of inclusiveness suggests that at least this norm is a necessary one (and not
just contributory); without the norm of inclusiveness being fulfilled, no
responsibility distribution can be justified as procedurally fair. However, although
fulfilling this norm is necessary, it is probably not sufficient. People also have to
recognize the legitimacy of other actors’ opinions and the need to justify their
own standpoint in terms of public reason. To account for the latter, reflective
learning processes may indeed be contributory. If there is a direct correlation
between an agent’s responsibility conception and what she considers a ‘‘fair’’
responsibility distribution, reflective learning is not just contributory but even
necessary. In the case described in the next section, I will analyze whether this
correlation is indeed present.
9 In Sect. 2, I explained how Rawls interpretation of public reason differs from Habermas’ notion of
public reason in that the former is more restricted. Since Rawls’ notion is assumed to be more
constructive and Habermas’ notion more reconstructive (Habermas 1995:131), it is probably dependent
on the field of application which interpretation could best be applied. In case of establishing a distribution
of responsibilities that is justifiable to all actors involved, Rawls’ constructive notion seems more
adequate. However, if one wants to organize participatory meetings in which deliberation serves to map
out divergency in opinions, Habermas’ reconstructive notion seems more adequate.




In this section, I briefly discuss a case study covering the development of a
prototype application for in-house monitoring of patients, based on Ambient
Intelligence (AmI) technology.10 This project was studied as part of an ethical
parallel study (see Van der Burg (2009) for a description of this kind of ethical
research). The aim of ethical parallel research is to carry out ethical investigations
parallel to, and in close cooperation with, a specific technological R&D project. The
R&D project described here is carried out by a consortium of 12 Small and Medium
Enterprises (SME), several universities, two independent industrial research
institutes and a scientific research center in rehabilitation technology.11 In the
project, a use case is developed to serve as an example of what can be done with this
technology and to focus the work of the demonstration activities of the project. The
use case describes a situation of in-house monitoring of the daily activities of a
patient with Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease (COPD), a chronic lung
disease. In the project, end users, including health care professionals, are consulted
to clarify their wishes and demands with respect to the monitoring application to be
created. After a first experimental set-up of the application, explorative experiments
with real users will be carried out to determine its functional and technical
requirements in more detail. Afterward the experimental application will be
evaluated both in terms of the technical specifications and in terms of the objectives
set to improve quality of life of the end users.
In the original research proposal, the technical researchers identified the social
acceptance of the currently developed technology as a crucial element of the success
of the project.12 The main focus of the author’s ethical investigations was therefore
on the necessary conditions for getting the technology socially accepted. On the
basis of a series of interviews with 13 representatives of the different institutional
partners involved in the project, a list of ‘‘moral issues’’ was identified (see
Table 1). The interviewees were asked to think of ‘‘moral issue’’ in as broad a way
as possible: anything related to risks and moral values (e.g., social acceptance,
human well-being, privacy, society, and sustainability) was considered relevant.13
10 Ambient Intelligence reflects a vision of the future of ICT in which intelligence is embedded in
virtually everything around us, such as clothes, furniture, etc. The technology consists of Wireless Sensor
Networks (WSN), the combination of body sensors, ambient sensors and wireless networks.
11 For a more elaborate description of the project, including the results of the ethical investigations, the
reader is referred to (Doorn forthcoming). The project started in December 2007 and was originally
planned to run till November 2010, but the end date is now extended till November 2011.
12 Although the term ‘‘social acceptance’’ suggests a strategic or prudential rather than moral intention, in
the interviews the technical researchers interpreted the term ‘‘acceptance’’ as referring to both acceptance
and acceptability. In the remainder I use the term to refer to this broad interpretation of social acceptance.
13 I realize that this description of moral issue is not as well-defined as some philosophers would like it to
be. However, since the interviews and the workshop were explicitly aimed at tracing the opinions of the
engineers themselves, I did not give any constraints on what counts as a moral issue nor did I introduce
issues that were not mentioned by the engineers themselves. For a more well-wrought description of when
a value can be considered a moral value, see Nagel 1979: Chapter Nine: The fragmentation of value.
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According to the technological researchers, these issues should be addressed in
order to gain social acceptance. Subsequently, a workshop was organized in which
the issues were discussed in more detail. This workshop was organized in the
university’s Group Decision Room (GDR, an electronic brainstorming facility that
allows for anonymous discussion and voting). This facility was chosen to fulfill the
criterion of powerless discussion and equal voice for all, which is central to the
procedural approach. The aim of the workshop was to trace the different rationales
for distributing the responsibility for addressing the moral issues. At the start of the
workshop, responsibility was defined as ‘‘the task to see to it that X,’’ where X could
refer to any of the moral issues. In the remainder of the text, I use the term ‘‘moral
task’’ for the responsibility to address particular moral issues.
The workshop was structured along the lines of the WRE approach to encourage
reflection on the different layers of morality (considered judgments, principles and
moral background theories) in the hope that this would facilitate learning processes
as well. Table 2 shows a summary of the empirical findings [see (Doorn
forthcoming) for a detailed presentation of the results]. The eight rows correspond
to the eight workshop participants. The moral background theories of each
participant (Column 2 in Table 2) were traced on the basis of the Ethical Position
Questionnaire (EPQ), a psychometric scale to measure ethical ideologies (Forsyth
1980; Forsyth et al. 1988).14 The participants were asked to distribute the ‘‘moral
tasks’’ over the different project activities. It was also possible to say that something
Table 1 Moral issues related to social acceptance
Moral issues
Making sure that the application does not interfere with everyday life (invisibility of technology)
Setting the requirements of the security of this applications (how secure is secure enough?)
Striking the right balance between user friendliness, reliability, and functionality
Making sure that end users (patients, their family & friends, and clinicians) are able and willing to use
the application
Starting a broad societal discussion about the desirability of these kinds of (monitoring) applications
Addressing questions related to data storage and data access (legal aspects)
Inventorying/monitoring potential risks of the present application
Identify how technological choices affect the social acceptance
14 These ideologies indicate the background considerations underlying moral deliberation, classified
along the two dimensions universalism and idealism. The first dimension refers to the extent to which
individuals reject universal moral rules in favor of relativism. The second dimension refers to the degree
to which individuals are idealistic or pragmatic in their attitude toward the consequences of actions. On
the basis of Likert scale responses to 20 statements, respondents were classified into one of the four
ideological categories without the need for interpretation by the interviewer. These categories are
situationism, absolutism, subjectivism and exceptionism. Situationists share with subjectivists a low score
on the universalism dimension (and similarly, absolutists and exceptionists share a high score);
comparably, subjectivists and exceptionists have a low score on the idealism dimension, whereas
situationists and absolutists share a high score on this dimension.
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was beyond the scope of the project (‘‘outside project’’).15 This distributing exercise
was done twice with a discussion in between in order to assess whether the
participants converged to a common opinion in the course of the workshop. In
addition, the different participants’ rationales for distributing responsibilities were
traced on the basis of a discussion about conditions for responsibility (Column 3).
The rationales are described in terms of recurring arguments that were used by the
participants to make their case. Column 4 shows the activity that was mentioned
most as being primarily responsible for each of the moral issues (this column shows
the aggregated results of the second distribution round only). Afterward, the
participants were asked whether the final distribution of responsibilities was ‘‘fair.’’
4.2 Discussion
When analyzing the empirical results, we have to keep in mind that several things
run together. First, the ethical parallel research itself probably has some effect on
the way the research is carried out and how the different responsibilities are
distributed. The technical researchers are probably more attentive to moral issues
due to the presence of an ethicist at their project meetings. Secondly, the workshop
was structured along the lines of the Rawlsian WRE approach so that the different
elements in the workshop were not only used to assess the individuals’ moral
opinions but also to encourage reflection (see also note eight on the dual use of
Rawlsian approaches). When we try to analyze the resulting distribution of
responsibilities in terms of the Rawlsian procedural framework and try to see
whether this approach did indeed reconcile the tension between the different
conceptions of responsibility, it is somewhat difficult to separate the effect of the
workshop itself from the effect of the procedural approach. However,
Table 2 Summary of empirical findings of the workshop
Actor EPQ typology Type of argumentation Project activity primarily
responsible
1 Absolutist/situationist Fairness (workload); workplace relations Clinical experimentation
2 Subjectivist Goal-directed; efficacy Project management
3 Situationist User perspective; societal; efficacy
(‘‘getting things done’’)
Clinical experimentation




5 Absolutist Fairness (workload) Research on software
6 Absolutist/exceptionist Fairness (workload); user perspective Clinical experimentation
7 Absolutist/situationist Fairness (workload) Clinical experimentation
8 Situationist User perspective; goal-directed Project management/clinical
experimentation
15 In order to avoid a discussion on a too personal level (‘‘you should have done that!’’) we used the more
neutral terms project ‘‘activities’’ or ‘‘phases’’ as the organizational entities to ascribe responsibility to.
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notwithstanding these multiple effects, we can still derive some interesting points
from the ethical parallel research and the workshop.
First, the workshop prompted discussion on the distribution of responsibilities in
the project. In their evaluation of the workshop, most participants indicated that they
had become more aware of certain moral issues (e.g., the need to involve end users).
There was a general agreement that most moral issues span several activities within
the project and that it is therefore difficult to single out one activity where it should
primarily be addressed. The primary responsibility was in those cases ascribed to
the project management for coordinating this joint effort, to the experimentation
phase where all activities were supposed to come together, or to the clinical partner.
Some participants explicitly mentioned that this workshop made them realize that
some moral issues were currently not addressed adequately. The idea that the work
should shift from research toward either laboratory or clinical experiments with a
(prototype) application was shared by all. Soon after the workshop, a brainstorm
meeting was scheduled in which the requirements for clinical experimentation were
discussed in more detail. Hence, one effect of the workshop was certainly to pay
more attention to the end users and to involve them in the research.
Secondly, although the participants endorsed rather different conceptions of
responsibility with different foci (consequences, fairness, tasks, duties, profession-
alism), they tended to be sensitive to one another’s arguments. Although it proved
difficult to attain consensus on all points, the opinions of the different participants
tended to converge between both ‘‘distributing exercises’’ (remember that the
participants were asked to distribute the responsibilities twice, with a discussion in
between). Whereas the first distribution of responsibilities showed a significant
scatter of tasks over different project activities and partners, the second distribution
showed more responsibility for the project management and the clinical partners.
Since all discussions and responsibility ascriptions were done anonymously, this can
be considered a genuine convergence and not the result of group pressure. The
participants were also asked about the fairness of the resulting distribution of
responsibilities. Interestingly, although the participants perceived the end result in
rather different ways, they all seem to interpret the end result more or less as a
consensus on how the responsibilities are to be distributed. Some interpreted the
outcome of the workshop as the insight that the ‘‘ethics’’ of the project is, in the end,
a joint effort, whereas others interpreted it as primarily a responsibility of the
clinical partners or the project management to coordinate this joint effort. However,
all participants agreed that, in the end, all project members should have a
commitment to the project as a whole (including the moral aspects).
Thirdly, when asked whether the workshop would affect the work in the project,
most participants indicated that it would indeed have implications for their work,
though for some only minor ones. All participants expected a shift in focus from
research toward either laboratory or clinical experiments with an (prototype)
application. One participant expected that the enduring impact of the workshop
would be to make more explicit what the project in fact aims for. Before the
workshop took place, the goal of the project was still rather ill defined. Additionally,
the opinions on what is part of the project became clearer and also more inclusive.
Some researchers initially considered most moral issues as being beyond the scope
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of the present project. However, during the discussion and in the second
‘‘distributing exercise,’’ most issues were included in the scope of the project,
with a central role for the project management.
When we assess the project in terms of the two procedural criteria developed by
Van de Poel and Zwart, we can identify the following points. First, both levels of
learning seem to occur. The various participants’ remark that they became more
aware of ethical issues is a clear sign of first-order learning. However, the
discussions indicate that this workshop prompted second-order learning processes as
well. Some senior participants worried about the fairness of the load for the PhD and
postdoctoral researchers, which indicates an openness to other people’s interests.
Moreover, the emphasis that the work requires a joint effort, spanning all the project
activities, also points to (second-order) reflective learning processes. Lastly, the fact
that the problem definition itself became object of discussion is also an indication of
reflective learning.
In terms of inclusiveness, the project clearly aims to be inclusive. It was
deliberately chosen to include a clinical partner in the project as well, herewith
attempting to make the project more than just a technological project. However, the
cooperation between the technical partners and the clinical partner proved difficult
in practice. During the workshop, it was also mentioned that the user involvement
was in fact rather weak. In that sense, the project was less inclusive than aimed for
at the start. However, soon after the workshop, more tangible attempts were made to
include end users. Since the researchers sincerely aimed at openness and
inclusiveness and since they did not raise formal obstacles for including more
people, we can conclude that this criterion is, at least partly, fulfilled.
What does the foregoing learn us about the necessity of the two procedural
norms: Are these norms indeed required? Regarding inclusiveness, the answer is
obviously yes. If the criterion of inclusiveness is released, the method loses its
justificatory force. In practice, it will be difficult to involve all relevant people in the
decision making directly. However, in a case such as the current project, the
interests of those people that are affected by the technology should at least be
represented. If we look at the end users, for example, it is important that their
interests are looked after. Even though they do not have to be involved in the actual
division of labor, the ultimate division of labor should include the task to look after
their interests. So, though indirectly, they should be included or represented in the
decision making process.
The second norm is learning. During the workshop, it was investigated to what
extent the moral background theories (Column 2 in Table 2) were predictive for the
actual distributions of responsibility (Column 4 in Table 2). The empirical findings
of the case suggest that there is no correlation between these two ‘‘layers of
morality.’’ People with similar moral background theories might come to different
responsibility distributions, and people with different moral background theories
might come to similar responsibility distributions. This suggests that reflective
learning (here, a willingness to change one’s moral background theory) is not
required to come to a similar distribution of responsibilities. However, without
reflective learning, people will probably not recognize the legitimacy of other
people’s arguments in the first place. So, reflective learning is probably still required
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to agree on the possibility and legitimacy of disagreement. People do not have to
change their own conception of what responsibility amounts to, but they do have to
acknowledge that their conception is one among many. In the empirical case,
reflective learning processes were present, especially in the discussion of the
fairness of responsibility ascriptions. It is questionable whether the outcome would
have converged as it did now, without these reflective learning processes. This
shows that both norms are indeed beneficial for getting a justified overlapping
consensus and that the norm of inclusiveness is also required.
5 Concluding remarks
In this paper, I developed a procedure for distributing responsibilities based on
Rawls’ political liberalism. The procedural model was applied to a technological
project that is currently being carried out. This project was studied as part of an
ethical parallel study. An interactive workshop was organized to discuss the
responsibilities for moral issues in the project. During the workshop, it appeared that
the team members endorse a large variety of responsibility conceptions and
rationales for distributing them.
The case shows that, in a pluralist setting, a procedural approach can be useful for
prompting discussion on the legitimacy of the different conceptions and the question
what a fair distribution of responsibilities amounts to. Although a full overlapping
consensus regarding the distribution of responsibilities is probably too demanding,
the case shows that the tension between the different conceptions can be alleviated
by structuring the discussion along the lines of the different layers of the Rawlsian
WRE approach, because this encourages participants to think in terms of ‘‘fair’’
workload and the legitimacy of other people’s arguments. Although some
differences in opinion remained, the effect of the workshop was that the work
became more focused and that certain moral issues that were until then not
recognized became part of the work. The two procedural norms (reflective learning
and inclusiveness), as proposed by Van de Poel and Zwart, were both (partly)
fulfilled.
Three points deserve further investigation. First, because the workshop was
structured along the lines of the WRE approach, it is difficult to assess whether it is
the workshop itself or the ‘‘procedural approach’’ that encourages reflection and
alleviate the tension between the different responsibility conceptions. If the
workshop was structured in a different way, not focusing on the different layers of
morality, would the result have been the same? This question cannot be answered on
the basis of this single case alone. Related to this point is the question whether the
method should be applied in its full justificatory function or mainly as a constructive
approach. Both questions need further research.
Secondly, the present case does neither confirm nor refute that (higher-order)
reflective learning processes are indeed indispensible for recognizing the legitimacy
of other people’s conceptions. Reflective learning proved, strictly speaking, not a
necessary condition: it may be theoretically possible to think of a situation where
people commit to reasonable pluralism without any instance of reflective learning.
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However, in practice it is highly unlikely that people will recognize the legitimacy
of other people’s responsibility conceptions in the absence of reflective learning
processes. Hence, although reflective learning is not logically necessary, in practice
it probably is required.
Thirdly, due to the divergent interpretations of the final distribution of
responsibilities, this final distribution cannot straightforwardly be interpreted in
terms of an overlapping consensus or in terms of individual WREs. In that sense, it
is maybe somewhat artificial to talk about ‘‘procedural justice’’ in this context. The
workshop did not explicitly derive or discuss procedural justice or cooperation
norms. However, the fairness of responsibility distributions was explicitly
discussed, including the question whether the final responsibility distribution could
be considered fair. Together this seems a first step to deriving procedural justice
norms.
More studies are needed for further developing the present approach to discuss
responsibility. Remaining questions are the role of reflective learning processes and
the different aims of the approach. My hypothesis is that the more challenging the
moral disagreements are, the more important these reflective learning processes
become and the more important it becomes to systematically touch upon the
different layers of morality. Alternatively, a discussion might easily arrive at an
impasse in which opposing opinions are merely expressed rather than being listened
to.
Acknowledgments This research is part of the research program ‘‘Moral Responsibility in R&D
Networks’’, which is supported by the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO) under
grant number 360-20-160. I would like to thank Ibo van de Poel, Nicole Vincent and the participants in
the philosophy seminar at the Royal Institute of Technology (KTH) in Stockholm (Dan Munter, Sara
Belfrage, and Mikael Dubois) for reading an earlier draft of the present paper. The article has profited a
lot from the comments and helpful suggestions they provided. Sabine Roeser is greatly acknowledged for
providing the German abstract.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Non-
commercial License which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any med-
ium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
References
Argyris C, Scho¨n DA (1978) Organizational learning: a theory of action perspective. Addison-Wesley,
Reading
Beauchamp TL, Childress JF (1994) Principles of biomedical ethics. Oxford University Press, New York
Bovens M (1998) The quest for responsibility. Accountability and citizenship in complex organisations.
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Brown HS, Vergragt P, Green K, Berchicci L (2003) Learning for sustainability transition through
bounded socio-technical experiments in personal mobility. Technol Anal Strateg Manage
15(3):291–315
Callon M, Laredo P, Rabeharisoa V, Gonard T, Leray T (1992) The management and evaluation of
technological programs and the dynamics of techno-economic networks: The case of the AFME.
Res Policy 21:215–236
Cohen J (1989) Deliberation and democratic legitimacy. In: Hamlin A, Pettit PH (eds) The good polity:
normative analysis of the state. Blackwell, Oxford
186 Poiesis Prax (2010) 7:169–188
123
Cohen J (1997) Procedure and substance in deliberative democracy. In: Bohman J, Rehg W (eds)
Deliberative democracy. MIT Press, Cambridge
Daniels N (1996) Justice and justification. Reflective equilibrium in theory and practice. Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge
Degrazia D (1992) Moving forward in bioethical theory—theories, cases, and specified principlism.
J Med Philos 17(5):511–539
Doorn N (2010a) Applying Rawlsian approaches to resolve ethical issues: inventory and setting of a
research agenda. J Bus Ethics 91(1):127–143
Doorn N (2010b) A Rawlsian approach to distribute responsibilities in networks. Sci Eng Ethics
16(2):221–249
Doorn N (forthcoming) Responsibilities within an ambient assisted living healthcare project. In:
Proceedings of the conference ‘‘ICT that makes the difference’’. Brussels
Dower N (2004) Global economy, justice and sustainability. Ethical Theory Moral Pract 7(4):399–415
Dryzek JS, Niemeyer S (2006) Reconciling pluralism and consensus as political ideals. Am J Pol Sci
50(3):634–649
Elster J (1986) The market and the forum. In: Elster J, Hylland A (eds) Deliberative democracy.
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 103–132
Elster J (1998) Deliberation and constitution making. In: Elster J (ed) Deliberative democracy.
Cambridge University Press, New York, pp 97–122
Fischer F (1980) Politics, values, and public policy. Westview Press, Inc, Boulder
Fischer F (1995) Evaluating public policy. Nelson-Hall, Chicago
Forsyth DR (1980) A taxonomy of ethical ideologies. J Pers Soc Psychol 39(1):175–184
Forsyth DR, Bye JL, Kelley KN (1988) Idealism, relativism, and the ethic of caring. J Psychol
122(3):243–248
Gert B, Culver CM, Clouser KD (1997) Bioethics: a return to fundamentals. Oxford University Press,
New York
Goodin RE (1995) Utilitarianism as a public philosophy. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Habermas J (1990) Moral consciousness and communicative action. MIT Press, Cambridge
Habermas J (1995) Reconciliation through the public use of reason: remarks on John Rawls’s political
liberalism. J Philos 92(3):109–131
Hardin R (1999) From bodo ethics to distributive justice. Ethical Theory Moral Pract 2(4):399–413
Hare RM (1988) Why do applied ethics? In: Rosenthal DM, Shehadi F (eds) Applied ethics and ethical
theory. University of Utah Press, Salt Lake City, pp 71–83
Hilhorst MT (2005) Directed altruistic living organ donation: partial but not unfair. Ethical Theory Moral
Pract 8(1–2):197–215
Holmgren M (1987) Wide reflective equilibrium and objective moral truth. Metaphilosophy
18(2):108–124
Hoogma R, Weber M, Elzen B (2001) Integrated long-term strategies to induce regume shifts to
sustainability. Towards environmental innovation systems. Eibsee, Germany
Ladd J (1991) Bhopal—an essay on moral responsibility and civic virtue. J Soc Philos 32(1):73–91
Little MO (1999) Abortion, intimacy, and the duty to gestate. Ethical Theory Moral Pract 2(3):295–312
Lustig BA (1992) The method of principlism—a critique of the critique. J Med Philos 17(5):487–510
McCarthy T (1994) Kantian constructivism and reconstructivism: Rawls and Habermas in dialogue.
Ethics 105(1):44–63
Mouffe C (1999) Deliberative democracy or agonistic pluralism? Soc Res 66(3):745–758
Mouffe C (2000) The democratic paradox. Verso, London
Nagel T (1979) Mortal questions. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Nihle´n Fahlquist J (2006) Responsibility ascriptions and vision zero. Accid Anal Prev 38:1113–1118
Oakley J, Cocking D (2001) Virtue ethics and professional roles. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Rawls J (1993) Political liberalism. Columbia University Press, New York
Rawls J (1995) Political liberalism: reply to Habermas. J Philos 92(3):132–180
Rawls J (1999 [1971]) A theory of justice. The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge
Rawls J (2001) Justice as fairness. A restatement. The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press,
Cambridge (Ma.)
Rogers JD, Bozeman B (2001) ‘‘Knowledge value alliances’’: an alternative to the r&d project focus in
evaluation. Sci Technol Human Values 26(1):23–55
Saari E, Miettinen R (2001) Dynamics of change in research work: constructing a new research area in a
research group. Sci Technol Human Values 26(3):300–321
Poiesis Prax (2010) 7:169–188 187
123
Sabatier PA, Jenkins-Smith HC (1993) Policy change and learning: an advocacy coalition approach.
Westview Press, Inc, Boulder
Scanlon TM (1982) Contractualism and utilitarianism. In: Sen AK, Williams BAO (eds) Utilitarianism
and beyond. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 128–130
Scho¨n DA (1983) The reflective practitioner. How professionals think in action. Basic Books, New York
Senge PM (1990) The leader’s New Work: building learning organizations. Sloan Manage Rev
32(1):7–23
St. John J (2007) Problems with theory, problems with practice: wide reflective equilibrium and bioethics.
S Afr J Philos 26(2):204–215
Thompson DF (1980) Moral responsibility and public officials. Am Pol Sci Rev 74:905–916
Van de Poel IR, Zwart SD (2010) Reflective equilibrium in R&D networks. Sci Technol Human Values
35(2):174–199
Van den Hoven MJ (1997) Computer ethics and moral methodology. Metaphilosophy 28(3):234–248
Van der Burg S (2009) Imagining the future of photoacoustic mammography. Sci Eng Ethics
15(1):97–110
Van Hooft S (2006) Understanding virtue ethics. Acumen Publishing, Chesham
Williams G (2008) Responsibility as a virtue. Ethical Theory Moral Pract 11(4):455–470
Young IM (1996) Communication and the other: beyond deliberative democracy. In: Benhabib S (ed)
Democracy and difference: contesting the boundaries of the political. Princeton University Press,
Princeton
Young IM (2000) Inclusion and democracy. Oxford University Press, Oxford
188 Poiesis Prax (2010) 7:169–188
123
